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While home ownership provides a great deal of personal and social benefits, it poses a 
substantial constraint on individuals’ asset allocation.  By deciding how much home to 
buy, individuals limit their ability to adjust their asset allocations between residential real 
estate and other assets.  Using a continuous-time framework we analyze the impact of 
this constraint on consumption, welfare, and post retirement wealth.  For reasonable 
parameter values we find that the total loss of utility due to the home ownership 
constraint is equivalent to 6% of total net worth.  This estimate ranges between 1 and 
15% depending on the starting wealth, home value, and personal income of the agent.  
We further show that the home ownership constraint substantially alters the asset 
allocation to financial assets.  For instance, if the value of the home exceeds the total net 
worth four times (not an unusual situation for many young households), the individuals’ 
allocation to stocks drops in half due to the home ownership constraint.  We also show 
that real estate investment has the additional benefit of providing a hedge against future 
increases in the cost of housing services.  Even with this benefit, however, the total 
allocation to real estate would be substantially lower if individuals could freely adjust 
their investment in real estate. 
  21.  Introduction 
Home ownership is an important part of the “American Dream.”  A broad range 
of state and federal government initiatives, from the income tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest expense to FHA loan guarantees, are designed to encourage home ownership.
1 
Nationally, the homeownership rate exceeds 67 percent.  Personal preferences and 
financial incentives make homeownership desirable for most families. However, such 
wide homeownership may or may not be socially optimal.  
Buying a home is a lumpy investment that places a constraint on the owner’s asset 
allocation decisions.  By deciding how much home to buy an individual limits their 
ability to adjust their asset allocations between residential real estate and other assets.  In 
this paper we analyze the impact of this constraint on consumption, welfare and post 
retirement wealth.  Understanding these implications is especially important today 
because of substantial concern about the future adequacy of the Social Security Trust 
Fund.   
In this paper, we abstract from the housing choice decision and start by assuming 
a representative individual has irreversibly chosen the home to live in until retirement.  
We then investigate their optimal asset allocation decisions when subject to a 
homeownership constraint.  Next, we consider the same individual’s asset allocation 
decisions when they have the ability to sell, without cost, a fractional interest in their 
home.  By comparing the asset allocation decisions and terminal wealth in these two 
cases, we estimate the differences in post-retirement wealth and the welfare gains 
potentially realizable if individuals’ asset allocation were not subject to the home 
ownership constraint.  
We employ a three state variable stochastic dynamic optimization to find the asset 
allocations and estimate the total expected utility in the two cases.  The state variables are 
total net worth, value of the home in which the agent lives, and personal income.  This 
methodology is particularly appropriate to analyze our asset allocation model because of 
the complex and time-varying constraints faced by a home owner.  
                                                 
1 Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) investigate the effect of the income tax deductibility of home mortgage 
interest payments on homeownership.  
  3For realistic parameter values we find that a home owner would require a 6% 
increase in total net worth to achieve the same utility level as an individual not facing the 
asset allocation constraint.  This compensation ranges between 1 and 15% of net worth 
over the state space we consider.  Furthermore we find that home ownership substantially 
alters the asset allocation to financial assets.  For instance, if the value of the home 
exceeds the total net worth four times (not an unusual situation for many young 
households), the individuals’ allocation to stocks drops in half due to the home ownership 
constraint.  At the same time, home ownership nearly doubles the amount of borrowing 
relative to the unconstrained case and reduces non-housing consumption.  As expected, 
the required compensation and the differences in asset allocation between the two cases 
diminish with time. 
Somewhat surprisingly we find that the evolution of wealth if all assets receive 
their expected rate of return through time is virtually identical in the two cases.  Even 
though real estate tends to have lower total return then stocks, it can be purchased with 
higher leverage which can potentially increase the expected return on investment.  In a 
stochastic environment, however, the evolution of wealth is very different in the two 
cases. 
We also find evidence that the allocation to real estate in the unconstrained case 
includes a small but important hedging component consistent with the theoretical model 
of Sinai and Souleles (2002).  In our model, an individual who is not subject to the home 
ownership asset allocation constraint has to pay rent proportional to the value of their 
home.  Therefore, an investment in real estate serves as a hedge against future increases 
in the rent payments and adds to the benefits of holding real estate as a pure investment 
asset.  Contrary to Sinai and Souleles (2002), we find that this hedging demand 
diminishes through time. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into sections that: (1) review the relevant 
literature and highlight our major extensions to the literature; (2) describe the asset 
allocation problem faced by individuals who are subject to a homeownership constraint; 
(3) describe the same problem for individuals who are not subject to the constraint; (4) 
describe the data and numerical solution that are used to explore the implications of the 
homeownership constraint, (5) evaluate the effect of the constraint on post-retirement 
  4wealth and utility, and (6) summarize our findings and suggest direction for further 
research. 
 
2.  Literature Background and Major Extensions 
Despite the vast literature on optimal portfolio choice, most papers do not 
consider the impact on asset allocation of an individual’s investment in a home (i.e., a 
durable consumptions good).  Three exceptions are Grossman and Laroque (1991), 
Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and Cocco (1999).  Grossman and Laroque (1991) develop 
a theoretical model with a single illiquid durable consumption good (e.g., a house) from 
which an infinitely lived investor derives utility.  The illiquidity derives from the fact that 
transaction costs are born when the good (house) is sold.  In addition to the durable good 
the individual can invest in a risk free asset and a set of risky financial assets.  At each 
time, the individual must decide whether to acquire a larger (smaller) house and how to 
allocate his or her remaining wealth among financial assets.  Grossman and Laroque 
show that it is optimal for the individual to wait for large increases (decreases) in wealth 
to increase (decrease) their consumption of the durable consumption good.  In addition, 
they conclude that transaction cost causes the individual to allocate a smaller portion of  
their financial wealth to risky assets than would occur if the individual could adjust home 
ownership continuously.  This paper does not consider the risk and returns to an 
individual’s investment in human capital when analyzing the optimal asset allocation. 
Flavin and Yamashita (2002) study the impact of the portfolio constraint imposed 
by the consumption demand for housing on an individual’s optimal holdings of financial 
assets.  In addition to a house, the individual can invest in T-Bills, T-Bonds, stocks, and 
borrow through a mortgage loan.  They use PSID data to explore the life cycle impact of 
the “housing constraint” (as reflected by the ratio of housing to net worth) on the 
individual’s optimal holding of financial assets.  The starting point of their analysis is the 
observed (from the PSID) ratio of housing to net worth.  Flavin and Yamashita then use 
mean-variance analysis to characterize optimal portfolios of financial asset over the life 
cycle.     
Cocco (1999) develops an empirically parameterized model of consumption and 
portfolio choice when there is an illiquid durable consumption good (a house).   In this 
  5paper the individual purchases a home for the consumption services it provides.   The 
value of the home is not stochastic.  The individual has a stochastic income and can 
invest in two financial assets: a stock fund and Treasury bills.  Cocco’s portfolio 
optimization model is then used to predict the cross-sectional pattern of variation in the 
composition of wealth by age and net worth.    
Within the last five years, Bertaut and Haliassos (1997), Guiso, Jappelli, and 
Terlizzesse (1996), Heaton and Lucas (1999), and Poterba and Samwick (1997) have 
empirically investigated the portfolio choice of households.  The goal of this research was 
to understand how labor income affects the allocation of wealth among financial assets.  
Unfortunately, when dealing with household level data it is not easy to develop an 
appropriate treatment of the investment in real estate.  Bertaut and Halliassos ignore the 
effect of housing altogether.  Heaton and Lucas recognize the importance of housing and 
include them as regression variables.  These papers do not provide theoretical 
justification for either excluding the consideration of real estate all together or including 
it in a partial equilibrium regression model.    
This paper extends the work of Flavin and Yamashita (2002) and Cocco (1999) in 
several ways:  
-  we consider both uncertain income from human capital and risky investments 
in residential real estate whose returns may be highly correlated.  
-  implement continuous-time long-term strategic asset allocation optimization 
subject to a number of realistic investment constraints 
-  explicitly model the main characteristics of investment in one single real 
estate property 
-  explicitly model the borrowing constraints associated with mortgage loans and 
margin account investing. 
The purpose of these extensions and of a number of other modeling choices is to 
develop a realistic picture of the impact of home ownership on asset allocation and post-
retirement wealth.  The introduction of human capital to the portfolio optimization 
problem is particularly important if real estate is one of the available investment assets.  
Income levels and the value of homes are almost always sensitive to local economic 
conditions.  For instance, if a regional economy is subject to a large negative shock, 
  6personal income (through hours of work or incidence of unemployment) and real estate 
values frequently decline in tandem.  A homeowner facing such conditions can see the 
value of their two most important assets decline.  Needless to say, this correlation can 
have serious negative implications for the overall risk of a homeowner’s asset portfolio.   
 
3.  Model  
We will consider a representative individual who has a working life and 
investment horizon of T <   (e.g., 20 years to retirement).  His or her objective is to 
maximize the present value of the expected utility from pre-retirement consumption and 
post-retirement wealth.  The individual has recently purchased a home for a price H.  The 
home is assumed to provide a constant flow of housing services.  The quantity of house 
bought (H) was determined by the individual’s demand for housing services and the 
house’s characteristics as an investment.  The purchase was financed with a fixed interest 
rate, full recourse mortgage whose contracted interest rate equals sum of the real 
mortgage rate, r, and the constant known inflation rate i
∞
 .
2  To capture the essence of the 
homeownership constraint, we assume the owner cannot sell the house until retirement at 
time T.
3  In addition, the individual has total wealth W > 0 that includes home equity and 
can be invested in a stock index and/or a money market fund.  Finally, until retirement 
the individual has stochastic income (y) derived from human capital.  
In the remainder of this section we describe the assets and formalize the 
representative individual’s asset allocation problem.  Two cases are considered: 
1.  The base case where the individual is subject to the homeownership 
constraint, and  
2.  The benchmark case where investments in residential real estate are not 
constrained (i.e., any non-negative amount can be invested in housing).   
We then compare the evolution of consumption and asset allocations.  This comparison 
allows us to evaluate the effect of the constraint on post-retirement wealth and total 
welfare. 
                                                 
2 We assume the loan is full recourse to eliminate consideration of the value of the option to default. 
3 What is relevant is not that the individual does not sell their house, but that the constraint on the 
individual’s allocation decision imposed by homeownership does not change.  For example, if the family 
moves, it moves to an equally valuable house with an equivalent loan to value ratio.    
  7 
3.1 The Assets    
As was noted earlier, the individuals can investment in two types of financial 
assets: a stock index and a money market fund.  Let St denote the real value of the 
individual’s investment in the non-dividend paying stock index fund at time t.
4  The 
dynamics of St are given by: 
 
 () SS dS r Sdt SdzS µ σ = ++ (1) 
 
where µS represent the risk premium over the real mortgage interest rate, r, and σS the 
volatility of the index fund, both of which are positive constants.
5   
The money market fund pays a real non-stochastic rate of interest equal to the 
real mortgage interest rate, r.  Analytically, deposits in the money market fund are 
equivalent to partial repayment of the mortgage loan.  In this way a homeowner can 
effectively increase their equity in their home.
6    
Although, in our base case, the homeowner cannot sell their house until 
retirement, there is a housing market where similar properties are sold.  This market 
provides information about the value of the housing portion of individual’s portfolio.  Let 
Ht denote the real value of the house, which is assumed to evolve according to the 
stochastic process: 
 
  H H dH Hdt HdzH µ σ = +  (2) 
 
where µH and σH are positive constants.  Note that the flow of housing services received 
from home ownership is independent of the owner’s equity position in the house.  For 
                                                 
4 Allowing the stock fund to pay dividends would not qualitatively change of our results 
5 Note that µS is typically the risk premium over the risk-free rate of return.  Here we take it to mean the 
risk-premium over the mortgage rate which is assumed to command a constant premium over the risk-free 
rate of interest. 
6 This assumption is made to simplify the analysis and avoid the possibility of arbitrage between the money 
market fund and the mortgage loan. 
  8this reason, the value of these services does not affect the individual’s asset allocation 
decision.  The correlation between the stock fund and home values is ρSH, with  
σSH = σSσHρSH denoting the covariance between the processes.  
The individual’s real income (return on their investment in human capital), yt, is 






µσ =+ (3) 
 
Let ρyH denote the correlation between income and the rate of home value appreciation, 
with σyH=σyσHρyH represents the corresponding covariance.  The correlation between 
income and the return on the stock market is denoted by ρyS,  with σyS=σyσSρyS being the 
corresponding covariance.  By assumption, post retirement income, t , is zero.    T ≥
 
3.2 Asset Allocation Base Case 
As we noted above, investments in the money market fund pay a non-stochastic 
rate of interest equal to the real mortgage interest rate, r.  Consequently, the individual’s 
mortgage loan balance and investment in the money market fund can, and will, be 
consolidated in our analysis (i.e., the mortgage loan is equivalent to a negative balance in 
the money market fund).   
In the base case, the individual’s home cannot be sold until retirement.   In other 
words, the investment in residential real estate is stochastic but constrained (i.e., 
exogenously determined).  Consequently, individuals have to optimally decide what 
portion of their wealth not tied up in home equity to invest in the stock index and money 
market funds. 
The individual’s objective is to maximize, by the choice of the level of 
consumption and asset allocation, the sum of the present value of the expected utility 
from consumption until retirement and the expected utility of post-retirement wealth.
7  
Assuming isoelastic utility of wealth, the optimization at time t is: 
                                                 
7 As noted above, we assume the utility of housing services is separable.  This assumption implies that 
housing services do not affect the optimization. 
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C denotes consumption of non-housing services, k is the homeowner’s rate of time 
preference, and γ is the risk aversion parameter.   
Our representation of the utility of post-retirement wealth, UW, is designed to 
reflect the trade off between pre and post retirement consumption.  To capture the 
essence of aging, while maintaining computational tractability, we assume the individual 
has a known time horizon (life), R, after retirement, (e.g.,20 years).  At retirement, the 
individual sells his or her house and cashes-in his or her investment in the stock index 
fund.  For simplicity we assume that the individual is able to avoid capital gains taxation 
on the sale of the home and the liquidation of stock index fund (e.g., through withdrawals 
from a 401k when labor income is zero).   The proceeds of these transactions, along with 
the individual’s money market fund balance, are then used to purchases an annuity that 










, for the rest of the individual’s life.
8  



















8 The individual is assumed to rent upon retirement. 
  10Next, we consider the evolution of wealth over time.  Let  t φ denote the proportion 
of wealth invested in the stock market, and ηt, denote the proportion of wealth invested in 
the house.  In the base case the individual owns a particular house until retirement and the 






 is stochastic, but not under his or her control.  It 
follows that 1 t φ η −−  is the proportion invested in the “money market fund”.  In 
general, this proportion will be negative, because real estate purchases are typically 
highly leveraged.  Thus, the evolution of real after tax total wealth, Wt, is given by: 
 
  ( ) (1 )
(1 )( (1 ) )
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where τ denotes the tax rate and r is the real before-tax interest rate.  Note that even 
though all assets, wealth, and income are in real terms, inflation affects the evolution of 
wealth ( iτ − ) because taxes are paid on nominal interest income from the money market 
fund.  Equation (6) reflects our previously noted assumption that the individual is able to 
avoid taxation on home value and stock market appreciation.       
The Bellman equation is: 
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  Substituting the optimal controls (12) and (13) into Equation (9) results in a 
partial differential equation for the value function.  This optimization is subject to the 
following constraints: 
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(1 ) for all 
2
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=  (14) 
 
where λ denotes the maximum allowable loan-to-value ratio and investment in stocks is 
subject to 50% margin requirement.  The first constraint simply states that the investment 
in stocks, at 50% margin, plus the minimum home equity cannot exceed the total wealth 
of the individual.  It should be noted that this constraint implies that a decline in home 
values may trigger a “margin call” where by the individual has to redeem part of his 
investment in the stock fund so that the maximum loan-to-value requirement is satisfied.    
 
3.3 Asset Allocation Benchmark Case 
In the benchmark case we separate the housing consumption decision from the 
real estate investment decision.  Analytically we accomplish this by allowing the 
representative individual to sell a fractional interest in their home.  In this way the 
individual can freely invest any non-negative proportion of their real total wealth into 
residential real estate.  In both the base and benchmark cases, the individual has just 
purchased the house they live in for H.  The individual lives in the house, but we now 
assume there is a market where fractional interests in a home can be sold.   
In the base case the value of the individual’s investment in housing is 
exogenously determined and we focus on the allocation of financial wealth.  Here the 
investment in residential real estate is a choice variable.  To adjust the actual to the 
desired level of investment in real estate the individual sells an interest in their house 
equal to H-ηW.
9 As with dividends when stocks are sold “short,” the individual has to 
pay “rent” of δ per dollar of value that is sold, that is a partial rent of δ(H-ηW).  
It follows that in the unconstrained or benchmark case that evolution of wealth is 
given by:  
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The Bellman equation becomes: 
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9Transactions costs would decrease the advantage of selling a fractional interest in the house and reduce the 
effect of the housing constraint.  
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4.0 Numerical Implementation and Data 
The effect of the homeownership constraint on asset allocation and post-
retirement wealth would be expected to depend upon the individual’s preferences and the 
investment opportunity set (e.g., risk and rates of returns).  In our analysis we have 
chosen default values for all parameters that we think are close to reality and reasonably 
represent the choices faced by a typical home owner.  Table 1 specifies the parameters of 
the model and the default values assumed in computing the subsequent figures.  Table 2 
lists the technical assumptions required for the finite difference solution methodology 
employed to solve both the constrained (base) and unconstrained (benchmark) cases.   
  15The numerical implementation utilizes an explicit finite difference approximation 
to solve differential equations (9) and (16) subject to the respective optimal controls and 
boundary conditions described above.  Unlike most continuous time asset allocation 
models, we cannot exclude wealth from our model.  In fact, the relationship between 
wealth and home value is a crucial element of our investigation.  However, including 
wealth in the solution poses a number of computational difficulties.  First, the typical 
boundary conditions of setting the first and second derivatives to zero or constants cannot 
be used in our setting because some of them enter the denominator of the expressions for 




WV , to a constant at the boundary.  This provides for very smooth and stable 
solutions.   
Furthermore, the higher order derivatives of the utility function we employ are 
non-zero and change substantially over the range of total wealth we consider.  For 
instance, the third derivative is very high in absolute value for low levels of wealth, and is 
numerically indistinguishable from zero for high levels of wealth.  The error of the first 
or second order numerical derivatives is sensitive to the higher order derivatives, which 
introduces a consistent bias in the optimization purely based on the numerical 
approximation.  To remedy this potentially serious problem we employ an exponentially 
variable grid in W.  For low levels of wealth, the grid is very dense, which reduces the 
numerical error in the first and second derivatives.  For larger levels of wealth, the grid is 
sparse, which allows for numerically tractable computation of the derivatives.  
Employing a variable grid is equivalent to a transformation in the state variables and the 
utility function.  To the extent that such transformation could potentially introduce further 
numerical errors and would make presentation of the results more difficult, we choose the 
variable grid approach. 
 
5.0 The Effect of the Home Ownership Constraint 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of the homeownership 
constraint on asset allocation and terminal wealth.  In this way we can estimate the utility 
loss associated with the inability to separate the decision as to how many housing 
  16services to consume from the decision as to how much to investment in residential real 
estate.    
 
5.1  Home Ownership and Total Expected Utility   
To picture the effect of the homeownership constraint, Figure 1 depicts the 
evolution of the optimal controls and state variables through time (i.e., over the 20 year 
time horizon to retirement) assuming stocks and real estate appreciate at their expected 
rate of return.  The starting point of the solution depicted in this figure is defined by the 
default parameters presented in Table 1.   
Panel A depicts the allocation of total wealth to stocks and housing.  The 
allocation to the money market fund is the complement of the sum of the allocations to 
stocks and housing.  The vertical axis is the proportion of total wealth allocated to each 
asset.  Initially, the allocation to stocks and real estate exceeds one and involves 
substantial borrowing (e.g., a negative allocation to the money market).  This implies that 
initially in the base case it is optimal for the representative individual to borrow almost 3 
times their net wealth.  Since the allocation to real estate is constrained, the evolution of 
H/W only reflects the growth of home value and wealth through time.  The evolution of 
the allocation to stocks reflects the constraint on total investment in the stock index fund 
through year 12, after which the optimal allocation drops as retirement approaches. 
Panel B depicts the optimal asset allocation in the benchmark case.  The 
allocation to real estate is substantially lower relative to the base case at the beginning, 
and slightly larger towards the end.  The allocation to stocks is driven by the total 
investment constrained until year 13, after which it starts to drop as retirement 
approaches.  Panels C and D depict the evolutions of consumption and total wealth in the 
two cases.  These evolutions are very similar because, while real estate has lower 
expected return, it can be purchased with higher leverage.  In terms of expected return, 
this makes investment in stocks and in highly levered real estate approximately equal. 
While the consumption and the evolution of total wealth are very similar in the 
two cases, the allocations to the assets are very different.  Under the base case, the 
allocations change substantially over the time horizon.  On average, the allocations in the 
benchmark case are less extreme and more consistent through time.  Furthermore, the 
  17effect of the home ownership constraint is largest at the beginning, i.e., for young 
households who have little net worth relative to current income.  As individuals 
accumulate wealth, the home ownership constraint becomes less binding and the asset 
allocations in the two cases become very similar. 
These differences imply that the expected volatility of the total portfolio in the 
two cases is very different.   Since the asset allocation is far more extreme in the base 
case, we would expect that the volatility of wealth would be higher.  This suggests that 
the total expected utility in the base case is substantially lower.  To verify this intuition, 
Figure 2 depicts the required compensation, as a percent of total wealth, for having to 
hold a pre-determined level of real estate.  To construct this figure, we find the wealth 
levels that provide the same total utility in the two cases.  We then report the percent 
difference in wealth that provides the same total utility.   
As expected, the base case has lower total utility for all levels of wealth.  For 
parameter values reported in Table 1, (i.e., H = 3.2, W = 1.2), this compensation is 
approximately 6% of total wealth, including equity in the house.  If the initial allocation 
is more balanced and closer or equal to the allocation in the benchmark case (e.g., H=1.5, 
W=1.5), the required compensation still exceeds 1% of total wealth because future 
adjustments are not possible in the base case.  As the initial holding of real estate gets 
larger while the total wealth remains small (e.g., H=4, W=1.2), the required compensation 
increases to as much as 10%.  On the other extreme, if the allocation to the house is 
substantially lower then the total wealth (e.g., W = 6, H = 1.5), the required compensation 
starts to increase slightly, but for a different reason: the investment in the house is below 
optimal.   
While Figure 2 is informative, it does not account for the impact of income on the 
required compensation.  Figure 3 depicts the required compensation as a function of 
property values and starting income.  For the initial case (i.e., H = 3.2, y = 1), this 
compensation is approximately 6% of total wealth which is the same as in Figure 2.  As 
expected, higher values of H increase the required compensation.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, higher income results in higher compensation.  Higher income makes 
investing in stocks even more attractive.  Having to hold a large fraction of wealth in real 
estate decreases the ability to invest in stocks due to the minimum equity requirement.  
  18This is why compensation increases with income.  This effect is largest if the value of the 
house is large, and can exceed 15% of total wealth over the range of real estate values 
and income considered. 
The main finding reported in Figures 2 and 3 is that even though consumption is 
very similar in both base and a benchmark cases, the total utility is substantially lower for 
the base case.  In other words, a forced investment in real estate is utility reducing.  The 
monetary equivalent of this reduction in total utility is between 1 and 15% over the range 
of state variables examined. 
 
5.2 Asset Allocation and Consumption 
In what follows we compare the asset allocation and consumption decisions in the 
base and benchmark cases.  Figure 4 depicts the asset allocations and consumption in the 
two cases and the difference between them.  Panels A through D depict the allocations 
and consumption in the base case.  Panels E through H depict the allocations and 
consumption in the benchmark case, and Panels I through L depict the allocation in the 
base case minus the allocation in the benchmark case for each asset or consumption.   
The allocation to stocks depicted in Panels A and E exhibits an interesting pattern.  
For low levels of wealth, the allocation is constrained by the total investment limit.  For 
higher levels of wealth, the allocation is not constrained.  Unlike Merton’s (1977) 
continuous time model, the unconstrained optimal allocation to stocks is not constant 
because of two reasons.  First, human capital is not included in total wealth yet we 
include the income from human capital in the optimization.  This is particularly important 
for low levels of total wealth (excluding non-human capital).  Individuals in this situation 
have high income, but low net worth.  According to our model, it is optimal for such 
individuals to invest as much as possible in the stock fund.   
The second reason for the dependence of the allocation to stock on the state 
variables in the benchmark case is that the value of real estate, H, determines the “rent” 
payments the owner needs to make if they sell a fractional interest in their home.  Higher 
real estate values result in higher rent, which, in turn, reduces the allocation of wealth to 
stocks. 
  19This effect is also evident in the allocation to real estate in the two cases.  By 
construction, the allocation to real estate in the base case (Panel B) is directly 
proportional to the value of the house, H.  The allocation in the benchmark case (Panel F) 
can be adjusted, however.  Nonetheless, the individual chooses to invest higher 
proportion of total wealth into housing in face of high real estate values.  This choice 
reflects the hedging benefits of real estate ownership as discussed by Sinai and Souleles 
(2002).  We will see below that this hedging demand for real estate disappears as 
retirement approaches.     
The investment in the money market fund also exhibits an interesting pattern.  
Intuitively, lower levels of wealth result in higher borrowing in both cases due to the 
inability to borrow against human capital.  Notice, however, that for low levels of wealth 
borrowing is substantially more extreme in the base case.  The kink shown in both cases 
reflects the areas where the total borrowing constraint is binding.  For wealth levels 
above the kink, the total borrowing constraint is not binding and all allocations are 
optimal.   
Finally, for all levels of total wealth, W, consumption declines marginally for 
higher levels of H in both cases.  For the base case, this effect is intuitive because higher 
forced investment in real estate increases the marginal value of wealth, which, in turn, 
reduces the optimal consumption level.  For the benchmark case, higher value of real 
estate increases the “rent” payments required if a portion of the house is sold, which, in 
turn, induces the individual to consume less and save more. 
Figure 5 depicts the optimal allocations and consumption in the two cases and the 
difference between them as a function of income, y, and house value, H.  Panels A 
through D depict the allocations and consumption in the base case.  Panels E through H 
depict the allocations and consumption in the benchmark case, and Panels I through L 
depict the allocation in the base case minus the allocation in the benchmark case for each 
asset or consumption.  The allocations in the base case are independent of income 
because the total borrowing constraint is binding and the holding of real estate cannot be 
changed.  Higher income makes investing in stocks more attractive, which is reflected in 
the allocations of the benchmark case.  The allocation to real estate decreases with 
income in the benchmark case because stocks are more attractive for higher income and 
  20the total borrowing constraint is still binding.  In other words, individuals reduce their 
real estate holdings to free up funds to invest in the stock market.  This is a strong result 
considering that by assumption real estate can be purchased at a substantially higher 
leverage then stocks.   
The level of consumption (Panels D and H) is, as would be expected, increasing 
in income.  Consistent with the above analysis of the investment in real estate, 
consumption falls for higher real estate values.  Notice that for all levels of income and 
house values consumption in the benchmark case is slightly higher reflecting the 
anticipation of higher returns and lower risk due to better asset allocation. 
To reinforce the message of the above figures, Table 3 reports the exact required 
compensation and allocation for several important situations.  The first line depicts the 
initial case using the parameters of Table 1.  The following three lines hold real estate 
and income constant and allow wealth to increase.  Not surprisingly, higher wealth levels 
are associated with lower required compensation.  This is another way of saying that the 
home ownership constraint is less binding for wealthier individuals.  The allocation to 
real estate in the base case is by construction falling for higher levels of total wealth.  
Notice that the allocation to real estate in the benchmark case is also falling for higher 
levels of wealth.  This suggests that a portion of the demand for real estate in the 
unconstrained case is driven by the desire to hedge against future increases of real estate 
values as discussed above. 
Another interesting result is that the allocation to real estate is actually slightly 
higher in the benchmark case for extremely high levels of wealth.  This suggests that the 
home ownership constraint may be limiting not only because it forces individuals to hold 
too much real estate, but, in some circumstances, because it forces them to hold too little.  
This is consistent with the pattern of required compensation reported in Figure 2.   
The next three rows of Table 3 hold wealth and income constant but allow home 
values to increase.  Not surprisingly, higher real estate values result in higher required 
compensation.  Furthermore, the difference between the asset allocations in the base and 
benchmark cases increases.  Interestingly, the allocation to real estate in the benchmark 
case increases with home prices even though the individual can freely reduce their 
  21investment in real estate.  This is due to the hedging demand for housing discussed 
above. 
The final three rows hold total wealth and real estate constant and allow income to 
grow.  Interestingly, higher levels of income require higher compensation.  As discussed 
above, this is due to the increased impact of the total borrowing constraint.   
 
5.3 Evolution of Asset Allocation through Time 
Most of the analysis so far was focused on the optimal allocations at time zero.  
The one exception was the evolutions of asset allocations, consumption, and wealth 
reported in Figure 1, but they are based on a single starting point.  In what follows, we 
examine the evolution of the asset allocation through time for the entire state space under 
consideration. 
Figure 6 depicts the allocation to stocks in the base and benchmark cases and the 
difference between them through time.  We report the allocations for time zero and years 
5, 10, 15, and 19.9 (i.e., one month to retirement).  The first row is identical to the 
allocations to stocks in Figure 4.  As time progresses, the total borrowing constraint 
becomes binding in fewer and fewer situations.  With very little time left to retirement, 
the benchmark case is entirely unconstrained and the optimal allocation to stocks is 
virtually independent of the state variables (notice the scale on the figure).  This is 
essentially a static optimization until retirement.  Notice that the optimal allocation to 
stocks falls as the time of retirement approaches.   
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the real estate allocation.  The first row is 
identical to the allocations to real estate in Figure 4.  By construction, the allocation to 
real estate in the base case does not change over time.  The allocation in the benchmark 
case substantially drops over time.  This is consistent with the fewer years of income 
remaining.  It also allows the total borrowing constraint to become less binding with time.   
Finally, Figure 8 depicts the evolution of the money market allocation.  The kink 
in all figures reflects the total borrowing constraint.  For levels of wealth below the kink 
the total borrowing constraint is binding, and for levels above the kink it is not.  The 
allocation to bonds in the base case marginally goes down in time.  The allocation to 
  22bonds in the benchmark case substantially drops through time, especially in the last few 
years. 
 
6.0  Conclusion 
Buying a home is a lumpy investment that places a constraint on the owner’s asset 
allocation decisions.  In this paper we analyze the impact of this constraint on a 
representative individual’s consumption, welfare and post retirement wealth.  We 
consider a representative individual who has irreversibly chosen the home to live in until 
retirement.  We investigate his or her optimal asset allocation decisions when subject to a 
homeownership constraint.  Next, we consider the same individual’s asset allocation 
decisions when they have the ability to sell, without cost, a fractional interest in their 
home.  By comparing the asset allocation decisions and terminal wealth in these two 
cases, we estimate the differences in post-retirement wealth and the welfare gains 
potentially realizable if individuals’ asset allocation were not subject to the home 
ownership constraint. 
For realistic parameter values we find that a homeownership constraint has a 
relatively large effect on the representative individual’s asset allocation.  Specifically the 
individual invests a larger than optimal fraction of his or her wealth in a home when 
investments in homes are lumpy and constrained.  We conclude that home owners would 
require a 6% increase in total net worth to achieve the same utility level as an individual 
not facing the asset allocation constraint.  As would be expected, the required 
compensation and the differences in asset allocation between the two cases diminish with 
time. 
Somewhat surprisingly we find that the evolution of wealth and consumption, if 
all assets receive their expected rate of return, is similar in the two cases.  Even though 
real estate tends to have lower total return then stocks, it can be purchased with higher 
leverage that can potentially increase the expected return on investment.  In a stochastic 
environment, however, the evolution of wealth and consumption can be very different in 
the two cases, as reflected in the total loss of utility due to the home ownership constraint.   
We further show that demand for real estate has a small but important hedging 
component.  Specifically, individuals invest more in real estate then predicted by the risk-
  23return characteristics of the pure investment asset.  The desire to hedge against future 
increases in rent payments generates this additional demand.  Nonetheless, for reasonable 
parameter values, the total investment in real estate is substantially lower if the individual 
can freely choose their asset allocation.  
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Figure 1 depicts the evolution of asset allocations, consumption, and wealth in the base 
and benchmark cases for a solution using the starting values of Table 1 and assuming all 
returns equal their expectation.  Some figures are not smooth because the solution jumps 
through the grid lines of the finite difference method as wealth is accumulated.  Panel A 
depicts the base case allocations to stocks and real estate.  Since the allocation to real 
estate is constrained at H/W, it’s evolution only reflects the growth of wealth through 
time.  The evolution of the allocation to stocks reflects the constraint on total allocation 
through year 12, after which it optimally drops as retirement approaches.  Panel B depicts 
the allocation to stocks and real estate in the benchmark case.  The allocation to real 
estate is substantially lower at the beginning, and slightly larger towards the end.  The 
allocation to stocks is driven by the total investment constrained until year 13, after 
which it starts to drop as retirement approaches.  Panels C and D depict the evolutions of 
consumption and total wealth in the two cases.  These evolutions are very similar 
because, while real estate has lower expected return, it can be purchased with higher 
leverage.  In terms of expectation, this makes investment in stocks and in highly levered 
real estate approximately equal. 
 
  27Figure 2: Compensation for the Constraint 
 
Starting point depicted 
in Figure 1 
(compensation = 6%) 
 
Figure 2 depicts the required compensation for having to hold a pre-determined level of 
real estate investment.  The x-axis depicts total wealth, W, which includes equity in the 
house, the y-axis depicts the value of the home, H, and the vertical axis depicts the 
required compensation as a percent of total wealth, W.  For the base case (i.e., H = 3.2, W 
= 1.2, y = 1), this compensation is approximately 6% of total wealth, including equity in 
the house.  If the initial allocation is more balanced and closer or equal to the allocation 
in the unconstrained case (e.g., H=2, W=2, y=1), the required compensation still exceeds 
1% of total wealth.  As the initial holding of real estate gets larger while the total wealth 
remains small (e.g., H=4, W=1.2, y=1), the required compensation increases to as much 
as 10%.  On the other extreme, if the allocation to the house is substantially lower then 
the total wealth (e.g., W = 6, H = 1.5, y=1), the required compensation starts to increase 
but for a different reason: the investment in the house is below optimal. 
 
 
  28Figure 3: Compensation for the Constraint and Income 
 
Starting point depicted 
in Figure 1 
(compensation = 6%) 
 
Figure 3 depicts the required compensation for having to hold a pre-determined level of 
real estate investment.  The x-axis depicts income, y, the y-axis depicts the value of the 
home, H, and the vertical axis depicts the required compensation as a percent of total 
wealth, W.  For the base case (i.e., W=1.2, H = 3.2, y = 1), this compensation is 
approximately 6% of total wealth, including equity in the house.  As expected, higher 
values of H increase the required compensation.  Somewhat surprisingly, higher income 
results in higher compensation.  Higher income makes investing in stocks even more 
attractive.  Having to hold a large real estate property decreases the ability to invest in 
stocks due to the minimum equity requirement.  This is why compensation increases with 
income.  This effect is largest if the value of the house is large, and can exceed 15% of 
total wealth over the range of real estate values and income considered. 
 
 
  29Figure 4: Optimal Allocations and Consumption 
 
 
Figure 4 depicts the optimal allocations and consumption in the two cases and the 
difference between them as a function of total wealth, W, and house value, H, for a level 
of income of 1.  Panels A through D depict the allocations and consumption in the base 
case.  Panels E through H depict the allocations and consumption in the benchmark case, 
and Panels I through L depict the allocation in the base case minus the allocation in the 
benchmark case for each asset or consumption.  The x-axis depicts the total wealth, W, 
and the y-axis depicts the value of the home, H.     
  30Figure 5: Optimal Allocations and Income 
 
 
Figure 5 depicts the optimal allocations and consumption in the two cases and the 
difference between them as a function of income, y, and house value, H, for a constant 
level of wealth of 1.2.  Panels A through D depict the allocations and consumption in the 
base case.  Panels E through H depict the allocations and consumption in the benchmark 
case, and Panels I through L depict the allocation in the base case minus the allocation in 
the benchmark case for each asset or consumption.  The x-axis depicts the current 
income, y, and the y-axis depicts the value of the home, H.  The allocations in the base 
case are independent of income because the total borrowing constraint is binding and the 
holding of real estate cannot be changed.   































t = 19.9 
 
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of the allocation to stocks in the two cases for years  0, 5, 
10, 15, and 19.9, i.e., one month to retirement.  The first row is identical to the allocations 
to stocks in Figure 4.  As time progresses, the total borrowing constraint becomes binding 
in fewer and fewer situations.  With 1 year left to retirement, the benchmark case is 
entirely unconstrained. 
 































t = 19.9 
 
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the allocation to real estate in the two cases for years 0, 
5, 10, 15, and 19.9, i.e., one month to retirement.  The first row is identical to the 
allocations to real estate in Figure 4.  By construction, the allocation to real estate in the 
base case does not change over time.  The allocation in the unconstrained case 
substantially drops over time.   































t = 19.9 
 
Figure 8 depicts the evolution of the allocation to bonds in the two cases for years 0, 5, 
10, 15, and 19.9, i.e., one month to retirement.  The kink in all figures reflects the total 
borrowing constraint.  For levels of wealth below the kink the total borrowing constraint 
is binding, and for levels above the kink it is not.  The allocation to bonds in the base case 
marginally goes down in time.  The allocation to bonds in the benchmark case 
substantially drops through time, especially in the last few years.   
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